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GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
David Bogen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment analysis of generally applicable laws 
is a new battleground for the Supreme Court. The Justices agree 
that the First Amendment protects expression and religious ex-
ercise from impairment by laws that are not generally applicable. 
The Court will carefully scrutinize laws that apply only to activi-
ties involving speech, press or the exercise of religion, e.g., 
parade permits, loudspeaker volume regulations, broadcast regu-
lation, and political leaflet regulation.1 Similarly, the Court will 
invoke First Amendment standards when a law applies to behav-
ior that is engaged in exclusively for reiigious or expressive pur-
poses, such as prohibiting the slaughter of animals for religious 
reasons.2 The standards for a generally applicable law are in 
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1. See Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (anonymous 
political leaflets); Thrn,er Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) [herein-
after Turner] ("must carry" rules for cable); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) 
(loudspeakers); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (parade permit). 
2. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) [herein-
after Lukumi]. 
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conflict, however, revealing an inconsistency that marks a pro-
cess of change. 
This article focuses on the generally applicable law that is 
also content-neutrat,J i.e. where the regulated behavior is usu-
ally engaged in for reasons other than expression or religious ex-
ercise, and the religious or expressive content of the behavior is 
irrelevant to the application of the law. For instance, a law 
prohibiting the sale or use of alcohol deals with behavior that 
usually is engaged in to achieve pleasurable sensations. 
Although alcohol use may be important in some religious cere-
monies, any impact on religion or expression from a general pro-
hibition on alcohol use is probably incidental. The issue is 
whether that impact should trigger an analysis under First 
Amendment standards. 
From one perspective, the concept of equality before the 
law is violated by exemptions from generally applicable laws, 
and the Constitution should not be interpreted to require such 
inequality. Thus, neither religious belief nor communicative in-
tent should provide its holder with a privilege to engage in con-
duct that would be illegal if it was engaged in by another.4 An 
3. Although the content of a law may be influenced by the enacting body's reli-
gious values, the law is "content-neutral" in the sense used here when the religious or 
communicative aspects of the regulated behavior are irrelevant. The content-based law 
turns on the content of the communication. Content-based laws are subject to "strict 
scrutiny." See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2477. "Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that 
the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress un-
popular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather 
than persuasion." /d. at 2458. The specific test applied, however, is very sensitive to 
context- e.g., whether the speech is injurious to reputation, arouses sexual thoughts, 
insults the listener, sells a product, etc. 
Content-neutral laws that regulate expressive behavior are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny "because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas 
or viewpoints from the public dialogue." /d. at 2459. That risk is even less from a 
content-neutral law that is also generally applicable. 
4. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). "Can a man excuse 
his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to 
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opposite perspective would stress the disparate impact resulting 
from the application of some laws to persons who act for reli-
gious or communicative reasons. Proponents of this latter per-
spective would argue that the constitutional concern for free 
exercise of religion and freedom of speech justifies some degree 
of protection from generally applicable laws.5 
Where the free exercise of religion is at issu~, a majority of 
the Justices in recent decisions have indicated that neutral, gen-
erally applicable laws do not violate the First Amendment.6 In 
1993, Congress passed "The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act"7 to restore the compelling interest test espoused by the mi-
nority in these cases.8 The statute does not direct the Court to 
change its interpretation of the First Amendment, but estab-
lishes a new statutory right. Future litigants claiming a burden 
on the free exercise of their religion are likely to rely on the 
statute, and thus the Court may have few occasions to reconsider 
its interpretation of the free exercise clause. The Court's posi-
tion on generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise 
Clause, however, ultimately may affect its resolution of the issue 
with respect to freedom of speech. 
The Court has sent mixed signals about the application of 
the guarantee of free speech to generally applicable laws. Some-
times it applies the test from United States v. O'Brien,9 which 
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in 
effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." /d. 
5. This latter perspective reflects Anatole France's sarcasm concerning "the ma-
jestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, 
to beg in the streets or to steal their bread." ANATOLE FRANCE, THE REo LILY 75 
(Modern Library trans., 1st ed. 1894) .. 
6. See, e.g., Lukumi, 508 u:s. at 531; Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990) [hereinafter Smith]. 
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4 (1994). 
8. The compelling interest test was set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 376 U.S. 398 
(1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
9. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) [hereinafter O'Brien]. 
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requires a law regulating expressive behavior to be justified by 
an important or substantial state interest that is unrelated to the 
suppression of expression and insists that the restriction on free 
expression be no greater than is essential to further that inter-
est.10 On the other hand, the Court has stated that the incidental 
effects of a generally applicable law do not violate the First 
Amendment.U Further, the Free Exercise Clause decisions on 
generally applicable laws have cited free speech cases as paral-
lelsP The current recognition of a conflict between the O'Brien 
test and the lack of scrutiny for generally applicable laws13 sug-
gests that the Court soon may resolve the differences and make 
its free speech decisions consistent with its free exercise jurispru-
dence. The O'Brien standard is under attack. 
A determination that content-neutral generally applicable 
laws are not subject to heightened scrutiny under the First 
Amendment might be justified on the grounds that the Amend-
ment is concerned with the purpose of the law rather than its 
effect on the individual. Even if a purpose-centered vision of the 
First Amendment is appropriate the Court should not lose its 
balance and endanger both speech· and religion by engaging in 
the direct search for purpose. Too often, even when an improper 
purpose exists, it cannot be proved. Justice Scalia's "objective" 
approach to determining legislative purpose14 increases the diffi-
culties of such proof and is therefore totally unsuitable for evalu-
ating constitutionality under the First Amendment. But the 
purpose inquiry will be underinclusive even if the Court consid-
ers the subjective statements of legislators, as it does when deter-
10. Jd. at 377; See also Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) 
(applying the O'Brien test). 
11. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). 
12. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878, 886 n.3. 
13. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458. 
14. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 558. 
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mmmg whether a facially neutral classification with a 
discriminatory impact has a forbidden purpose under the Equal 
Protection Clause. A First Amendment test that relies on find-
ings of purpose to invalidate laws permits unnecessary injury to 
speech and religion. 
The compelling interest test as applied to generally applica-
ble laws, satisfies the claims of freedom of speech and the free 
exercise of religion, but, applied uncritically, could hamper the 
government's ability to act for legitimate purposes. The Court 
should instead apply the O'Brien test because it assures both the 
government's ability to accomplish its legitimate functions and 
the protection of speech and religion from unnecessary 
restriction. 
II. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The majority of the Court has said that the incidental im-
pact on religious exercise of a generally applicable law does not 
require a compelling governmental interest to justify it.15 Such 
statements led Justice O'Connor to accuse the majority of giving 
generally applicable laws a "talismanic" immunity from scrutiny 
under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.16 This im-
munity may also extend to generally applicable laws affecting ex-
pression, since the Court has stated that its: free exercise 
principles are closely related to those invoked for generally ap-
plicable laws that have an incidental impact on expression. 17 
A. The Free Exercise Inquiry 
The Court's current position on the free exercise of religion 
is complicated. The Court repudiated a "compelling interest" 
First Amendment standard when scrutinizing a neutral, gener-
15. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
16. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
17. /d. at 878, 886 n.3; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543. 
HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 206 1996-1997
206 SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
ally applicable law, but it retained several anomalous exceptions. 
The rejection of the "compelling governmental interest" test 
does not necessarily foreclose the application of a lesser stan-
dard, but the Court has not suggested one. The majority is di-
vided over the proper approach for determining whether a law is 
neutral, and the Court has not established a standard for deter-
mining whether a law is generally applicable. Finally, the enact-
ment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act may have the 
perverse result of freezing judicial interpretation of the free ex-
ercise of religion in its current confused condition.18 
1. Laws Targeted at Religious Exercise 
The Court will invalidate laws that target religious beliefs, 
including laws that punish behavior only when engaged in for 
religious reasons.19 There are two identifiable harms that result 
from some religious beliefs. First, the beliefs themselves may be 
deeply offensive to persons who disagree with them, and second, 
they may prompt the believer to engage in socially harmful con-
duct. Prevention of the first injury is not a proper state interest 
under our philosophy: The second may be dealt with by legislat-
ing against the harmful conduct rather than the belief. In Em-
ployment Division Department of Human Resources v. Smith,20 
Justice Scalia's1majority opinion began its discussion of the First 
Amendment in absolute terms: 
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right 
to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. 
Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all "governmen-
18. Marci Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into 
the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 357, 381 (1994); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The 
Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 39, 76-77 
(1995). 
19. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535~40. 
20. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
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tal regulation of religious beliefs as such." The government may 
not compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the expression 
of religious doctrines it believes to be false, impose special disa-
bilities on the basis of religious views or religious status, or lend 
its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious 
authority or dogma.21 
207 
Conduct conforming to religious beliefs, however, may 
threaten interests that society legitimately can protect. The 
Court has long recognized the dichotomy between abstract belief 
and religiously based actions.22 But the dichotomy may also be 
misleading. A law that prohibits an action only when that action 
is engaged in for religious reasons targets belief rather than be-
havior. Such a classification is supported only by the illegitimate 
interest in suppressing belief. 
It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved 
the point), that a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion]" if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when 
they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the 
religious belief that they display.Z3 
A few years after Justice Scalia wrote .these words, the hy-
pothetical became reality. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye 
v. Hialeah24 the Justices agreed that a city's ordinances forbid-
ding animal sacrifices were directed unconstitutionally at behav-
ior only when the behavior was engaged in for religious reasons, 
specifically the exercise of the Santeria religion of the Church of 
21. /d. at 877 (citations omitted). 
22. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
23. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. The attempt to protect persons from acts of racial or 
religious discrimination has not been regarded as posing serious First Amendment 
problems, unless the act itself was the utterance of words. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 
508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993). The perpetrator's beliefs are relevant to the protection of the 
victim from harmful acts and they are proscribed only when manifested by such acts. 
24. 508 u.s. 520 (1993). 
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Lukumi Babalu Aye.25 The ordinances failed the strict scrutiny 
test.26 
The Court unanimously held that Hialeah's ordinances were 
not neutral and generally applicable, but the Justices did not pro-
duce a unanimous opinion.27 They disagreed over whether laws 
that target religion are per se invalid, on the proper method to 
ascertain whether legislation is neutral and generally applicable, 
and on the proper test to be applied to neutral, generally appli-
cable laws. 
2. Neutrality and General Applicability 
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Lukumi referred 
to a "requirement" of neutrality and general applicability. He 
noted that " [ n ]eutrality and general applicability are interre-
lated."28 Neutrality is determined by the object of the law.29 
General applicability involves categories of selection.30 Any law 
affecting religion must use the proper means ("general applica-
25. /d. at 545. 
26. /d. at 546. 
27. /d. at 546, 531. 
28. /d. at 531. 
29. Justice Scalia defined "neutrality" as governed by the face of the statute while 
"general applicability" dealt with the object of the statute: 
In my view, the defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to those laws that by 
their terms impose disabilities on the basis of religion ... ; whereas the defect of lack 
of general applicability applies primarily to those laws which, though neutral in their 
terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement target the practices of a 
particular religion for discriminatory treatment. 
/d. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Souter argued that neutral-
ity was not limited to the object of the law, but applied to its effect as well: 
(O]ur common notion of neutrality is broad enough to cover not merely what might 
be called formal neutrality, which as a free-exercise requirement would only bar 
laws with an object to discriminate against religion, but also what might be called 
substantive neutrality, which, in addition to demanding a secular object, would gen-
erally require government to accommodate religious differences by exempting reli-
gious practices from formally neutral laws. 
/d. at 561-62 (Souter, J., concurring). 
30. /d. at 542. 
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bility") to achieve a proper end ("neutrality"). Neutrality analy-
sis often invokes overbreadth - where the burden on religious 
exercise is not necessary to satisfy legitimate government inter-
ests, the overbreadth reveals that the law's object· is to burden 
religion.31 General applicability analysis invokes underinclusive-
ness - where religious exercise is burdened while non-religious 
behavior threatening similar legitimate interests of government 
is. not.32 The category used by the underinclusive law is too nar-
row, even ifa legitimate interest of government is satisfied. Of 
course, the narrow categorization also indicates that the object 
of the law was to burden religion. 
Neutrality and general applicability are requirements for 
the validity of laws under the Free Exercise Clause because 
there is no legitimate state interest that justifies violating them. 
Restriction of religion is not a legitimate object of any law. 
While the law may deal with harm caused by religion, such harm 
is unlikely to be unique to religion .. Thus, a classification limited 
to religion carries on its face the indicia of illegitimate purpose. 
Justices O'Connor and Blackmun said "regulation that targets 
religion in this way, ipso facto, fails strict scrutiny. "33 Justice 
Kennedy's majority opinion avoided a per se rule, but it will be 
difficult for any such law to satisfy his requirement that it be 
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government 
interest.34 
a. Neutrality 
Justice Kennedy stated in Lukumi that "if the object of a 
law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their reli-
31. See id. at 538-39. 
32. See id. at 543-45. 
33. /d. at 579. 
34. See id. at 531-32. 
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gious motivation, the law is not neutral."35 Some laws are inva-
lid on their face, but facially neutral laws also may have an 
improper object. "Official action that targets religious conduct 
for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance 
with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise 
Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked, 
as well as overt. "36 
Justice Kennedy focused on the text of a resolution passed 
simultaneously with the ordinances, the discriminatory impact of 
the ordinances, and their overbreadth to unmask their hostility 
to the Santeria religion.37 This portion of his opinion received 
no objections.38 Justice Kennedy's next step, however, provoked 
disagreement. Citing the analysis of neutrality in equal protec-
tion cases, Justice Kennedy used the statements made by mem-
bers of the decisionmaking body during the hearings to show 
that the object of the law was to burden religion.39 
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist protested this use 
of statements made in the course of the political process. They 
35. /d. at 533. 
36. /d. at 534. 
37. /d. at 526-29, 535-40. The overbreadth and underinclusiveness analysis applied 
to only three of the ordinances. /d. at 535-40. The Court struck down a fourth ordi-
nance that was passed the same day as the others and also effectively prohibited 
Santeria practices. /d. at 540. The Court said that all four ordinances might be treated 
as a group for neutrality purposes, because "[i)t would be implausible to suggest" that 
only the first three ordinances "had as their object the suppression of religion." /d. 
38. This part of the opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Rehnquist, and 
Thomas. Justice Blackmun's concurrence, in which Justice O'Connor joined, did not 
discuss the evidence for finding the ordinances were not neutral but did find the law 
discriminated against religion as such. /d. at 579. Justice Souter's concurrence also 
stated that prohibiting religion was "the object of the laws" without further pursuing 
the analysis. /d. at 559. Justice White did not write separately, but refused to join this 
portion of the opinion. It seems unlikely that Justice White objected to the analysis of 
the evidence, and more likely that it was the separation of the categories of neutrality 
and laws of general applicability that drew his objection. 
39. /d. at 541-42. 
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distinguished between the object of the laws and the subjective 
motivation of the lawmakers, stating "(t]he First Amendment 
does not refer to the purposes for which legislators enact laws, 
but to the effects of the laws enacted . . . . This does not put us in 
the business of invalidating laws by reason of the evil motives of 
their authors."40 
b. General Applicability 
Justice Kennedy's discussion of the general applicability of 
the laws avoided consideration of legislative motive. He said 
that government, "in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a 
selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by 
religious belief. "41 Justice Kennedy did not define the standard 
for general applicability, but noted that the ordinances in ques-
tion fell well below the minimum standard.42 This portion of his 
opinion was controversial only because it suggested that a neu-
tral, generally applicable law needed no further scrutiny. The 
Justices agreed that the ordinances were not generally applicable 
laws in view of their text and their failure to reach non-religious 
behavior that posed similar secular problems for society.43 
3. The Exemption from First Amendment Scrutiny for 
Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws 
The law targeting religion stands at one extreme. The law 
forbidding murder is at another. The neutrality of a law is evi-
dence that it responds to legitimate concerns and that injury to 
religion is not its object. The general applicability of the law 
confirms this. For Justice O'Connor, the neutrality and general 
40. Id. at 558. 
41. Id. at 543. 
42. Id. Justice Souter commented that "general applicability is, for the most part, 
self-explanatory." Id. at 561 (Souter, J., concurring). 
43. See id. at 545-46. 
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applicability of the law are merely evidence of a legitimate state 
interest, not reasons to change the standard for evaluating that 
interest. For her, the First Amendment requires the interest to 
be compelling to sustain a state law that restricts religious 
exercise. 44 
The majority of the Court has been troubled over where to 
draw the line if it exempts religious conduct from generally ap- , 
plicable laws. Weighing the values at stake in particular cases: 
tends to become arbitrary in practice and provides little gui-
dance to lower courts. The more stringent the free exercise test, 
the more situations where government (here the Cour:t) .compels 
a disparity of treatment favoring religious believers. This raises 
concerns from another section of the First Amendment - the 
Establishment Clause.45 The Court responded to these problems. 
by jettisoning the "compelling interest" test. 
Where the Court finds a law to be both neutral and gener-
ally applicable, it will not apply strict scrutiny to the law's impact 
on religious exercise. For example, Justice Kennedy's plurality 
opinion in Lukumi cited Smith for the proposition that: 
In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of 
religion, our cases establish the general proposition that a law 
that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified 
by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the 
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.46 
The statement left open the possibility that the First Amend-
ment requires neutral laws ofgeneral applicability to meet some 
44. This is, of course, a gross simplification. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1985) (no heightened scrutiny where planned gov-
ernment road on public land would disrupt religious use of land by Indian tribes since 
no one was coerced into violating their beliefs nor penalized by denial of any right or 
benefit enjoyed by others). 
45. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 
u. CHI. L. REV. 308, 320 (1991). 
46. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531. 
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intermediate test, such as serving an important or substantial 
government interest, to justify imposing such a burden on reli-
. . g10us exerctse. 
It is very unlikely that Justice Kennedy intended his opinion 
to support an intermediate standard. Justice Souter, in his 
Lukumi concurrence, attacked Justice Kennedy for failing to re-
pudiate Smith. The Smith opinion, written by Justice Scalia, re-
ceived the support of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Kennedy, Stevens, and White. Justice Scalia's majority opinion 
in Smith did not simply negate the compelling government inter-
est test, but suggested that neutrality and general applicability 
insulated the law from First Amendment challenge. "[I]f prohib-
iting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of print-
ing) is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of 
a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First 
Amendment has not been offended."47 
The Court must examine laws affecting religious exercise to 
determine whether they are generally applicable and whether 
the object of the law is neutral. According to Justice Scalia, 
however, satisfaction of those tests is sufficient.48 A neutral, 
generally applicable law that burdens the exercise of religion is 
not subject to First Amendment scrutiny.49 
I 
Although Justice Souter urged the Court in his Lukumi con-
currence to reexamine Smith, the current Court, while differing 
47. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
48. Justice Scalia observed that the Court has held "that general laws not specifi-
cally targeted at religious practices did not require heightened First Amendment scru-
tiny even though they diminished some people's ability to practice their religion." 
Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579 (1991) (Scalia J., concurring) (citing 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885). 
49. Justice Souter's Lukumi concurrence characterized Smith as stating that "if 
prohibiting the exercise of religion results from enforcing a 'neutral, generally applica-
ble' law, the Free Exercise Clause has not been offended." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 559. 
(Souter, J., concurring). 
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over criteria for determining neutrality, appears to support 
Smith's holding. 5° If neutrality and general applicability insulate 
a statute regardless of its impact on the particular exercise of 
religion, the Court must be focusing on the government's behav-
ior rather than that of the religious practitioner. Thus, Smith as-
sumes that the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause protects 
only against government action with the forbidden object of 
harming religion. 
' '' 
4. Free Exercise Anomalies 
Justice Souter joined the chorus of commentators who find 
the Smith rationale at war with decisions it purportedly distin-
guished, stating "[w]e are left with a free-exercise jurisprudence 
in tension with itself. "51 Justice Scalia attempted in Smith to dis-
tinguish cases like Sherbert v. Verner.52 Sherbert and its succes-
sors held that the state could not deny unemployment . 
compensation to individuals who lost their jobs because their 
religious beliefs conflicted with their job requirements.53 The 
Smith opinion found the Sherbert line of cases applicable only to 
laws where there is in place a system of individualized exemp-
tions,54 but Smith, like Sherbert, was an unemployment compen-
50. Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, Stevens, and White joined in Smith. 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 873. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor took a 
different view of the proper rule. /d. at 891. In Lukumi, Justices Blackmun and 
O'Connor reaffirmed their disagreement with Smith and Justice Souter appeared ready 
to join them. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 577-80, 559-77. Justice Thomas, who replaced Justice 
Marshall on the bench, joined in the sections of Justice Kennedy's Lukumi opinion that 
spoke approvingly of Smith. /d. at 522. Thus, even if Justices Breyer and Ginsburg 
oppose the rule of Smith, five votes remain in support- Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas. 
51. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 564. 
52. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
53. See id. at 410. 
54. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
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sation case. Further, the distinction itself is problematic.55 
Almost every rule of law creates individualized exemptions at 
some level of abstraction. For example, the prohibition against 
murder seems to be a law of general application, but the general 
prohibition against taking another's life doesn't apply to self-de-
fense, military necessity, or even to accidents not amounting to 
criminal negligence. This may be described as the definition of a 
law of general applicability whose application to religious mur-
der raises no First Amendment problems, or it may equally well 
be described as a system of individualized exemptions whose 
failure to include actions taken for religious reasons requires a 
showing of a compelling governmental interest. There is no ob-
jective basis offered to distinguish which laws fit into which cate-
gory. The underlying question remains why the particular law 
sanctions the behavior when it is religiously motivated. 
Justice Scalia's claim that other decisions supporting free 
exercise claims against general criminal laws, like Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 56 mixed another constitutional right with the free exercise 
claim is not reflected in the language of those opinions. As Jus-
tice Souter suggested in Lukumi, the peyote users in Smith also 
might claim free expression or privacy rights, so Smith is not 
distinguishable. 57 
The weaknesses of the distinctions do not .mean that the 
Court will overrule either Smith or those cases that point in an-
other direction. In Lukumi, Justice Kennedy used the "individu-
alized exemptions from a generalized requirement" analysis as 
part of the rationale for invalidating the Florida ordinance that 
55. See John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise 
Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REv. 71, 74 (1991} (arguing that the 
Smith Court incorrectly distinguished "between types of cases in which the Court must 
weigh the competing interests of the individual and the government."). 
56. 406 u.s. 205 (1972). 
57. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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forbade "unnecessary" killing of animals.58 Assuming the con-
stitutional issue comes before it again, the Court will choose the 
line of cases which it finds most appropriate. One way it may 
reconcile the cases is to find that certain exemptions raise issues 
over the law's purpose and thus suggest that the law is not gener-
ally applicable.59 
5. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act may avert the re-
examination of Smith that Souter called for in Lukumi.60 That 
would be ironic because one purpose of the Act (which sharply 
criticizes Smith) is to "restore the compelling interest test. "61 
Even more perverse, as a result of the Act, the next test of the 
Smith doctrine in the Court may find Congress implicitly sup-
porting it. 
In the future, any person whose religious exercise is sub-
stantially burdened by state government will claim it is a viola-
tion of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Even if the 
plaintiff also raises a constitutional claim, the Court could give 
58. Id. at 537. 
59. See infra Part II.C for an attempt to explain the decisions in terms of the likely 
purpose of the law. 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). See also Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, BYU L. REv. 221, 254-55 (1993). 
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Findings 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court 
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on 
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and 
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a 
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and 
competing prior governmental interests. 
(b) Purposes 
The purposes of this chapter are-
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guaran-
tee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened. 
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relief under the statute without reaching the plaintiff's constitu-
tional objection. 
The Court will examine the Act's constitutionality.62 The 
statute makes no attempt to tie its operation to effects on com-
merce but apparently relied on Congressional power under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that 
Amendment.63 The scope of that power remains controversial.64 
Several scholars have questioned whether Section 5 is sufficient 
to support the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,65 and several 
others have asserted that it is not.66 Nevertheless, the current 
Court may well uphold the Act. 
62. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, 83 F.3d 421 
(5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 95-2074). 
63. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that an activity must 
"substantially affect" interstate commerce to be within Congress's power to regulate it 
under the Commerce Clause). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) 
(holding that "[s]ection 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a positive grant of legisla-
tive power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining the need for 
and nature of legislation to secure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.") /d. at 642. 
64. Hamilton, supra note 18, at 389. See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 
(1970) (limiting the scope of§ 5). 
65. "The constitutionality of this legislation ... raises a number of questions involv-
ing the extent of Congress's powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994). See Ira Lupu, Statutes Re-
volving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REv. 1, 52-66 (1993); Scott C. Idleman, 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 247, 285-322 (1994). 
66. The precedents have involved the prevention of race discrimination, the core of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court might not give Congress as 
much leeway with respect to enforcing the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. See Jay 
S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1624-33 (1995) (First Amend-
ment is disability on Congress creating implied immunity in states from congressional 
regulation, and Section 5 does not affirmatively empower Congress to change the rela-
tionship); Conkle, supra note 18, at 61-78 (arguing that the Act frustrates the primary 
function of the Court as interpreter); Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, Why 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437,460-
69 (1994) (arguing that the Act conflicts with the Court's substantive judgment of con-
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Justices O'Connor and Souter, opponents of the Smith stan-
dard, should have no difficulty in sustaining the statute as simply 
providing procedures to vindicate the Constitutional right of free 
exercise of religion against state interference. Justices Breyer 
and Ginsburg might well agree. If so, only one more vote from 
among the supporters of Smith would be necessary to uphold the 
Act. 
Smith's supporters may find the statute constitutional with-
out changing their views or acknowledging any superior power 
of constitutional interpretation in Congress. Just as Congress 
was permitted to ban the use of literacy tests in elections because 
they could be used to discriminate against racial and ethnic 
groups,67 it may ban laws that substantially burden religious ex-
ercise without showing a compelling interest because such bur-
dens could be imposed for the impermissible object of harming 
religion. Given the difficulties of determining the object of a 
law, some overbreadth is necessary to assure that no law with the 
improper objective of suppressing religious exercise is enacted. 
Thus, the statute enforces the command of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (incorporating the First) that government not 
abridge the free exercise of religion, even though the statute 
reaches government action that is not itself violative of the 
Amendment. If the Court follows this reasoning, it could uphold 
stitutional value); and Hamilton, supra note 18, at 387-96 (arguing that Congress is an 
inappropriate body to enforce First Amendment incorporation against states because 
the constitutional provision indicates suspicion of Congress). 
Further, a congressional mandate of religious "accommodation" unless a compel-
ling interest is shown arguably violates the command of the First Amendment that Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. See Idleman, supra 
note. 65, at 285-302 (suggesting this is an open question); Eisgruber and Sager, supra 
note 66, at 452-60 (arguing that the Act violates the Establi.shment Clause). 
67. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
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the Religious Freedom Restoration Act without reconsidering its 
opinion in Smith. 68 · 
The Act may even ironically support Smith. It states that it 
applies to federal legislation, including subsequent enactments, 
unless they explicitly refer to the Act and exclude application. 69 
Since one Congress cannot disable its successor from passing a 
law, this provision should be understood as a guide to interpreta-
tion. Courts should construe federal statutes to contain, in ef-
fect, an accommodation clause, i.e. federal laws do not apply 
where their application would substantially burden a person's 
exercise of religion unless the application furthers a compelling 
governmental interest.70 If a federal statute expressly negates 
any accommodation clause, the Court would have to reach the 
constitutional issue.71 Under those circumstances, the implicit 
68. See Bonnie Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589 (1996); Douglas Laycock, 
Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FoRDHAM L. REv. 883, 897 
(1994); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, BYU L. REv. 221, 
254-55 (1993); Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:Legislative Choice 
and Judicial Review, BYU L. REv. 73, 90-94 (1993); and Matt Pawa, Comment: When 
the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Exami-
nation of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1029 (1993). 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (a) (1994). 
70. A court may find that the legislature intended a subsequently enacted statute to 
apply to a religious exercise despite the absence of explicit reference to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act. See Gordon Young, Some Reflections on Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 45 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1986); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of 
Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185 (1986). Explicit exclu-
sion of the Act is tantamount to an admission that Congress believes its statute imposes 
a substantial burden on religion that is not justified by a compelling interest. Rather 
than make such an admission, Congress might specify that a particular statute should 
apply to all persons "regardless of any impact on the religious exercise of any individ-
ual." This is particularly likely if the Court construed an earlier version of the statute to 
be inapplicable to a religious exercise because of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act. 
71. It is possible, but unlikely, that the Court could duck the issue. Even if the 
Court previously construed a similar statute to be inapplicable to religious exercise be-
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position of Congress would support the rule in Smith, if neces-
sary to uphold its statute. 
B. The Free Speech Inquiry 
There is a close relationship between the Free Exercise of 
Religion Clause and the Free Speech Clause in the First Amend-
ment. Smith cited cases on freedom of the press to support the 
proposition that the First Amendment is not offended by the in-
cidental effect of an otherwise valid law of general application.72 
Similarly, in Lukumi, Justice Kennedy said, "The principle un-
derlying the general applicability requirement has parallels in 
our First Amendment jurisprudence. "73 
cause of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Court might find the reenactment 
with an express negation of any religious exemption corrects the Court's construction 
and provides evidence that the government interest is compelling. Thus, the new stat-
ute may be sustained as satisfying a compelling interest without forcing the court to 
reassess whether an interest of lesser magnitude would be sufficient under the 
Constitution. 
72. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878, 886 n.3 (citing Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 
394 U.S. 131 (1969) for the proposition that "generally applicable laws unconcerned 
with regulating speech that have the effect of interfering with speech do not thereby 
become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the First Amendment."). 
73. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543. In support of this statement, he cited cases on free-
dom of speech and establishment of religion. 
With respect to the requirement of general applicability, Justice Kennedy wrote 
for six members of the Court, including Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Stevens, Thomas and 
White. A neutral law that burdens religious exercise is usually a law of general applica-
tion. There are few legitimate state interests (other than the prevention of discrimina-
tion against religion) that require a law that operates only in the area of religion. That 
is particularly true because the establishment clause protects against state support of 
religion just as the free exercise clause protects against burdening it. Thus, there has 
been little need to develop the notion of the "generally applicable" law in free exercise 
jurisprudence separate from analysis of the "neutrality" of the law. 
On the other hand, content-neutral laws affecting free speech may be limited to 
categories of expression. The Federal Communications Commission regulates cable 
and broadcast media; local and state laws regulate time, place and manner for speech in 
public forums. Such laws may be content-neutral, but they are not of general applica-
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There are significant differences in the problems posed by 
speech and religion. Unlike the situation with respect to the free 
exercise of religion, the lack of general applicability for a regula-
tion affecting speech does not demonstrate the absence of legiti-
mate state interests. There are many reasons to regulate 
communication apart from the message being communicated, in-
cluding concern over volume and conflicts with other uses of 
space. Valid content-neutral laws that are not generally applica-
ble are common. Nevertheless, a content-neutral regulation that 
applies only to means of expression invites scrutiny. "[L]aws 
that single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special 
treatment 'pose a particular danger of abuse by the State,' ... 
and so are always subject to at least some degree of heightened 
First Amendment scrutiny."74 They still may pose significant 
dangers to expression, and may either be manipulated or be 
designed to hinder groups with particular views or to exclude 
particular topics from public debate. 
The general applicability of a law provides some assurance 
that the law is not designed to harm the expression of ideas, but 
general applicability alone does not protect against content dis-
crimination to the extent it protects religious beliefs. Normally, 
generally applicable laws that affect free exercise are regulations 
of conduct enforced without regard to the content of the beliefs 
of individuals engaging in that conduct. Thus, the application of 
the law to conduct engaged in for religious reasons does not 
raise suspicions of hostility to religion. 
In speech cases, however, the impairment often occurs be-
cause the state claims that the content of the speech comes 
within the statutory scope of a generally applicable law, e.g. 
breach of the peace, obstruction of the draft, intentional infiic-
bility. The Court rarely receives a challenge based on a free speech claim to a neutral 
law of general applicability. 
74. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458. 
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tion of emotional harm. Thus, such laws are not ultimately con-
tent-neutral, and their application to speech raises a suspicion of 
animus toward the ideas expressed.75 It is only where the gener-
ally applicable law regulates conduct regardless of the ideas ex-
pressed that the issue of the impact on free speech becomes 
analogous to that of free exercise. 
The question is whether the Court will give heightened scru-
tiny to neutral and generally applicable laws that impact expres-
sive conduct. The Court may be in the process of transition on 
this issue, moving from an intermediate level of scrutiny toward 
the absence of scrutiny adopted in its free exercise decisions. 
1. The Conflict in the Cases 
In Turner, Justice Kennedy underscored the Court's confu-
sion: "the enforcement of a generally applicable law may or may 
not be subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amend-
ment."76 Cohen v. Cowles Media77 and Barnes v. Glen Theater, 
Inc. ,78 decided in the same term, upheld laws that applied to ex-
pressive activity on the same basis as laws that applied to non-
expressive activities. Like ships passing in the night, the two de-
cisions took no notice of each other as they approached the issue 
of generally applicable laws under the First Amendment from 
opposite directions. 
75. Words are often used as an essential part of a course of conduct that is punish-
able, e.g. fraud, intimidation, blackmail, copyright violation. Libel, obscenity, and fight-
ing words are punishable by laws that would be hard to call "content-neutral." The 
Court gives careful scrutiny to these laws and has created a variety of tests dependant 
upon context to deal with laws affecting speech that are not content neutral, but such 
laws may be sustained. 
76. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458 (comparing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 
663, 670, (1991) with Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-67 (1991)). 
77. 501 u.s. 663 (1991). 
78. 501 u.s. 560 (1991). 
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a. Barnes v. Glen Theater- The O'Brien Test 
In Barnes, the plaintiffs sued to enjoin the application of In-
diana's public indecency statute to nude dancing. The statute 
forbade nudity in public. On its face, the prohibition applied re-
gardless of any expressive intent on the part of the nude individ-
ual - whether dancing, walking, standing, or sleeping. The 
State argued that regulation of public nudity was a permissible 
"time, place or manner" regulation of expression.79 
The Court began its analysis by determining that the con-
duct in question, nude dancing, was protected expression.80 It 
then looked to the level of protection to be afforded such expres-
sion. The Court found the appropriate standard for laws regulat-
ing expressive conduct in O'Brien, which upheld the application 
to a war protestor of a statute punishing the burning of a draft 
card.81 O'Brien stated that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' ele-
ments are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently 
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech el-
ement can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms."82 The O'Brien test sustains a regulation that is other-
wise within the scope of government power if "it furthers an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if 
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest. "83 
79. Id. at 566. 
80. Id. at 565-66. 
81. 391 u.s. 367 (1968). 
82. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376). 
83. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
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O'Brien applies not only to time, place, or manner regula-
tions of speech,84 but also to laws of general applicability- after 
all, the prohibition on burning a draft card applied regardless of 
any expressive motivation. Portions of the O'Brien test overlap 
the neutrality tests used by Justice Kennedy in Lukumi. If a law 
cannot be justified by any interest unrelated to suppression or if 
its impact on expression is not necessary to further any legiti-
mate interest, the Court may find that its object is not speech-
neutral.85 Unlike Justice Kennedy's neutrality test, however, 
O'Brien rejected any inquiry into the actual motives of the legis-
lators. In this respect, it is consonant with the views of Justices 
Scalia and Rehnquist. On the other hand, O'Brien does not ex-
empt the narrowly tailored, facially neutral law from further 
First Amendment scrutiny, since it requires that a challenged law 
further an important or substantial governmental interest.86 
In Barnes, eight Justices divided evenly on the outcome of 
the case under the standards of O'Brien.87 Justice Scalia, who 
84. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 
468 u.s. 288 (1984)). 
85. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32. 
86. O'Brien, 501 U.S. at 376-77. 
87. Justice Rehnquist found that the statute furthered a substantial government 
interest in protecting order and morality, that the interest was unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression, and that the statute was narrowly tailored to that end. Barnes, 
501 U.S. at 560-61. Justice Souter's concurrence found the statute furthered the ends of 
combating the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments, such as prostitu-
tion, sexual assault, and other criminal activity. /d. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring). The 
four dissenting Justices noted the lack of enforcement against nudity in theatrical pro-
ductions, and contended that the selectivity of enforcement showed the state's interest 
was in suppressing the mode of expression. /d. at 590 (White, J., dissenting). They 
argued that the interest of the general public nudity statute was to protect the public 
from offense, but that rationale was inapplicable to performances before a consenting 
audience. !d. at 595. They concluded that the statute was not narrowly drawn to satisfy 
the legitimate state interests. The dissent analyzed the case to show that it failed the 
O'Brien test used by Justices Rehnquist and Souter, and also the test for neutrality 
urged by Justice Scalia, but they did not independently set forth their own analytic 
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cast the deciding vote, repudiated O'Brien. He supported the 
Indiana public indecency law because, "as a general law regulat-
ing conduct and not specifically directed at expression, it is not 
subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all."88 Further, "the only 
First Amendment analysis applicable to laws that do not directly 
or indirectly impede speech is the threshold inquiry of whether 
the purpose of the law is to suppress communication. If not, that 
is the end of the matter so far as the First Amendment guaran-
tees are concerned. "89 Distinguishing expressive conduct from 
speech, Justice Scalia argued that the First Amendment does not 
apply to laws that affect expressive conduct unless their purpose 
is to suppress communication.90 
framework. Justice White did conclude that "our cases require us to affirm absent a 
compelling state interest supporting the statute." /d. at 595. 
88. /d. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
89. /d. at 578 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia was quoting from his own dis-
senting opinion in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'd, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
90. According to Justice Scalia, any law that restricts "speech," even for a reason 
unrelated to suppression of communication, must meet a high standard to be justified 
under the First Amendment. He pointed out, however, that the language of the First 
Amendment protects "speech" and "press" and does not explicitly include "expression" 
that is neither written nor oral. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 576. Thus, he concluded that the 
First Amendment standards applicable to speech and press did not apply to expressive 
conduct. /d. He recognized, however, an implicit guarantee of freedom of expression 
that protected against laws whose purpose was to suppress the communicative content 
of conduct. Justice Scalia referred to the "more generalized guarantee of freedom of 
expression" which "makes the communicative nature of conduct an inadequate basis 
for singling out that conduct for proscription." /d. at 578 (emphasis in original). 
This linguistic argument should not be pressed too far. Justice Scalia stated that 
the Court had already adopted his approach to regulations of conduct in free exercise 
cases. /d. at 579 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). But Smith undermines any argument that First Amend-
ment standards vary according to a distinction between explicit and implicit guarantees. 
The Court used the purpose-centered inquiry in Smith as the standard for determining 
the violation of an explicit guarantee. The First Amendment forbids any law that pro-
hibits the free exercise of religion. It does not distinguish between religious belief and 
religious conduct, and thus provides no justification for using different levels of scru-
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[V]irtually every law restricts conduct, and virtually any prohib-
ited conduct can be performed for an expressive purpose - if 
only expressive of the fact that the actor disagrees with the prohi-
bition . . . . It cannot reasonably be demanded, therefore, that 
every restriction of expression incidentally produced by a general 
law regulating conduct pass normal First Amendment scrutiny, or 
even ... that it be justified by an "important or substantial" gov-
ernment interest.91 
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion acknowledged that al-
most limitless types of conduct may be expressive, but he re-
sponded that the Court rejected this expansive notion of 
expressive conduct. He found that nude dancing is expressive 
conduct protected by the First Amendment, but his opinion of-
fered no criteria for determining when an expressive activity is 
protected by the First Amendment.92 None of the members of 
the Court directly critiqued Justice Scalia's distinction between 
expressive conduct and speech in this case, or his contention that 
the generally applicable law that incidentally affects expressive 
conduct is not subject to the First Amendment. They simply ap-
plied O'Brien. 
tiny. Justice Scalia himself noted, "the 'exercise of religion' often involves not only 
belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts." 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. The purpose-centered inquiry for laws affecting religious or 
expressive conduct, therefore, is more policy oriented than derived from language. 
Conduct poses greater problems to society than belief, so the state more easily can 
justify regulations that affect religious conduct. However, the greater likelihood that 
conduct regulations will meet a constitutional standard does not justify reducing the 
level of constitutional scrutiny. 
91. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 576-77. 
92. The issue is an important and difficult one. All behavior may be said in some 
way to express the nature of the individual. Our choices of clothes, housing, jobs, and 
toothpaste communicate something about our identity to others. We may speak of 
those choices as "expressions" of our personality. Nevertheless, communication of 
ideas is not the purpose of those actions. The First Amendment will be invoked only 
when the communication of ideas is a substantial basis for engaging in that behavior. 
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b. Cohen v. Cowles Media 
While Barnes appears to demonstrate that the Court will 
apply the O'Brien tests to a law of general application that af-
fects expressive conduct, Cowles93 supports the proposition that 
the First Amendment does not apply to such a law. Cohen 
sought damages against a newspaper for breach of its promise 
not to reveal his identity as an informant.94 The Court held that 
his promissory estoppel action was not barred by the First 
Amendment.95 Justice White's majority opinion referred to the 
"well established line of decisions holding that generally applica-
ble laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because 
their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its 
ability to gather and report the news. "96 Justice White seemed 
to view Cowles as an attempt by the media to gain an exemption 
from laws applicable to others, citing the line of cases that de-
nied the media special treatment. But Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent pointed out that Cowles' claim was based on the content of 
the speech and. not the identity of the speaker.97 
The dissenters distinguished the decisions Justice White 
cited: "this case does not fall within the line of authority holding 
the press to laws of general applicability where commercial ac-
93. 501 u.s. 663 {1991). 
94. /d. at 666. 
95. /d. at 670. 
96. /d. at 669. The Court cited a series of cases in which it refused to grant the 
press greater rights than individuals under the First Amendment. /d. (citations omit-
ted). Justice White made the point that a newspaper publisher '"has no special immu-
nity from the application of general laws."' /d. at 670 (quoting Associated Press v. 
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)). Thus, Justice White said, "enforcement of such 
general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to 
enforcement against other persons or organizations." /d. The importance of Cowles 
does not lie in its invocation of caselaw but in its suggestion that laws regulating con-
duct without regard to whether such conduct is expressive do not violate the First 
Amendment. 
97. /d. at 673. 
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tivities and relationships, not the content of publication, are at 
issue. "98 Although the law of promissory estoppel is content-
neutral (the state does not determine the content of the forbid-
den behavior: the individual does so by her promise) and is of 
general application (most of its specific applications are to con-
duct other than speech), its effect in this case made the press 
liable for damages for publishing specific information. Where 
the law operates to forbid a specific statement, the dissenters in-
sisted that it is subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Quoting 
from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Smith, the dis-
senters said "[t]here is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of 
general applicability. "99 
Rather than weighing the interests of society against the 
speech interests impaired, the Justices in the majority did seem 
to find a talisman in the general applicability of the law. They 
characterized the law's inhibition on truthful reporting of a 
source's identity as the "incidental, and constitutionally insignifi-
cant, consequence" of a generally applicable law.100 
There can be little doubt that the Minnesota doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel is a law of general applicability. It does not target 
or single out the press. Rather, in so far as we are advised, the 
doctrine is generally applicable to the daily transactions of all the 
citizens of Minnesota. The First Amendment does not forbid its 
application to the press.101 
The distinction that Justice Scalia drew in Barnes between 
speech and expressive conduct vanished in this opinion - nam-
ing a source in writing appears to be protected by the express 
language of the First Amendment, yet Justice Scalia joined Jus-
tice White's opinion in finding the impact on the press "constitu-
98. !d. at 676-77 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
99. /d. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
100. /d. at 672. 
101. /d. at 670. 
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tionally insignificant."102 The crucial factor seemed to be that 
the law was content-neutral in the sense that its application to 
the content of Cowles' speech was a product of Cowles' in-
dependent action. This made it analogous for the majority to the 
media exemption claim cases.103 
The Court in Barnes applied the "important and substantial 
governmental interest" test of O'Brien as the appropriate stan-
dard for a law affecting expressive conduct, while the Court did 
not attempt to evaluate the government interest in Cowles. 
None of the judges in Cowles even mentioned the O'Brien line 
of cases. The distinction in the cases between expressive conduct 
and expression cut against the way in which they were decided. 
One would think the Court would be embarrassed to give nude 
dancing more scrutiny than it gave the press, yet it did so. 
The Cowles Court did not mention Barnes or attempt to dis-
tinguish that case. As the Cowles dissent pointed out, the major-
ity's precedents denied media an exemption from general 
business laws whose only impact on speech or press was that 
they impose the same costs of doing business on the media as 
were imposed on all other businesses.104 The incident to which 
the law attached in those cases was not expressive conduct, but 
normal business practices such as receiving revenue105 or em-
ploying workers.106 But Cowles went beyond those cases to vali-
102. /d. at 672. In Smith, Justice Scalia treated a general tax that fell on the press 
just as he treated regulations of expressive conduct in Barnes. He wrote in Smith that 
"if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the 
object ... but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid 
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended." Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
103. See Cowles, 501 U.S. at 669. 
104. /d. at 676-77 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
105. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 581 (1983) (applicability of corporate tax rates to bookstores). 
106. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (application of labor laws to 
news service). 
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date, without further analysis, a generally applicable law that 
resulted in a direct impact on speech. 
Perhaps the best explanation for the decision in Cowles was 
offered by Srikanth Srinivasan in a perceptive article on inciden-
tal restrictions of speech.107 Srinivasan argued that whether gen"7 
erally applicable laws that incidentally restrict speech are subject 
to First Amendment standards depends "on the likelihood of a 
speech-suppressive administrative motivation. "108 This . theorY. 
reconciles the majority opinions in Barnes, Cowles, and the line 
of decisions that relied on Cowles. Where the law is triggered by 
conduct that has a significant expressive element (like the nude 
dancing in Barnes), there is a danger that the l!lw was motivated 
by _a desire to suppress expression. There is a significant chance 
that enforcement decisions will also be affected by the concern 
to suppress. Srinivasan contended that the threat of a speech 
restrictive motive underlies the statement in Arcara v. Cloud 
Books109 that general laws that do not target expression raise 
First Amendment problems only "where it was conduct with a 
significant expressive element that drew the legal remedy in the 
first place, ... or where [the law] has the inevitable effect of 
singling out those engaged in expressive activity."110 In Cowles, 
however, there was no First Amendment problem because the 
decision to invoke the generally applicable law was not made by 
the government but by a private individual.111 Thus, Srinivasan 
107. Srikanth Srinivasan, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment: 
A Motive-Based Rationalization of the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence, 12 CaNST. CoM-
MENTARY 401 {1995). 
108. /d. at 420. 
109. 478 u.s. 697 {1986). 
110. /d. at 706-07. 
111. There are several other differences that make Cowles less likely than Barnes to 
be a product of a desire to restrict speech. First, the restriction in Cowles applied only 
to the newspaper and did not prevent others from identifying Cohen as the source, but 
the restriction in Barnes precluded the specific form of expression for everyone. Sec-
ond, the public indecency statute may have had a closer nexus to conduct associated 
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said, "the unstated underpinning of the Court's decision may 
well be the impossibility of an illicit administrative motive."112 
That is why Cowles may appropriately be treated like the press 
cases it cites in which the law is unlikely to have any speech-
suppressive motive because the activity that invokes its opera-
tion is not itself expressive. 
Srinivasan's article explains the decisions, but the principle 
'it avows was not stated as a standard for decision. First Amend-
ment questions are raised whenever a law has a negative impact 
on some expression. Whether a particular law is susceptible to 
speech-suppressive motivation often is not an easy judgment. 
Does a law like promissory estoppel become particularly attrac-
tive because it may be used to suppress information? If the gov-
ernment can predict which private individuals are likely to use 
the law and which situations are likely to be most common, it 
might adopt a privately enforced law of general applicability for' 
a speech-suppressive reason. 
Assuming that concern with the possibility of speech-sup-
pressive motivation is at the base of the Court's decisions, the 
Court might prefer to use standards of decision that focus on 
identifying the purpose of the law. According to Srinivasan's 
analysis, laws triggered by expressive conduct should almost al-
ways be subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny.U3 But 
with expression than the doctrine of promissory estoppel, i.e. individuals are more 
likely to engage in public nudity as a means of expression than to violate their represen-
tations as a means of expression. Third, expression restricted by promissory estoppel 
may take many forms, but the expression limited by the public indecency statute is 
primarily of a sexual nature. Thus, the possibility that the object of the Indiana law was 
repression of sexual expression was greater than the likelihood that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel was designed to stop publication of the names of sources. Fourth, 
the Indiana statute criminalized the behavior, while promissory estoppel simply results 
in liability for damages. 
112. Srinivansan, supra note 107, at 420. 
113. Id. at 401. 
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Srinivasan did not apply the analysis to free exercise cases, and it 
is inconsistent with Smith where there was no heightened scru-
tiny for a law that regulated a religious ritual. The Court has not 
expressly adopted Srinivasan's principle, and it may instead fol-
low Justice Scalia's lead to a purpose based standard which rec-
onciles its free speech cases with its free exercise decisions. 
Cowles might be justified on the grounds that the content-
neutrality of the restrictions at issue in the earlier media cases 
were what insulated those generally applicable laws from First 
Amendment scrutiny. This view of Cowles raises the possibility 
that the Court may now exempt content-neutral generally appli-
cable laws from further scrutiny. O'Brien's standard may be 
eliminated from the expressive conduct arena of its birth as it is 
transformed into the standard for regulations of time, place, and 
manner of speech. Justice Kennedy highlighted that possibility 
with his suggestion that Barnes (the expressive conduct case re-
lying on O'Brien) and Cowles (generally applicable law not sub-
ject to scrutiny) are inconsistent.114 His casual comment in 
Turner that generally applicable laws "may or may not be subject 
to heightened scrutiny" may be the death knell to O'Brien.U5 
2. The Pressure to Equalize the Standards 
Justice Scalia has argued that the principle of Smith is even 
more important for scrutinizing expressive conduct under the 
First Amendment. "Relatively few can plausibly assert that their 
illegal conduct is being engaged in for religious reasons; but al-
most anyone can violate almost any law as a means of expres-
sion."116 In effect~ the same concerns that drove the Court's 
114. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458. 
115. /d. 
116. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 579 (Scalia, J., concurring). But one can posit a religious 
belief in natural law that scorns manmade laws and makes the violation of law a reli-
gious exercise. We have not lacked for unusual religious beliefs. 
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decision in Smith, the concerns abo.ut balancing as a judicial 
technique together with an unease about treating people un-
equally as a result of their subjective intentions, are also in free 
expression cases. 
It is anomalous to give more protection to expressive con-
duct than to conduct engaged in for religious reasons. Religious 
exercise often involves expression protected by the Free Speech 
Clause, but sometimes it is a private act with no communicative 
aspects. Regulation of those private religious acts has more seri-
ous consequences for the free exercise of religion than regula-
tion of expressive conduct has for free expression. Regulation of 
expressive conduct does not foreclose the expression of the idea, 
although it may diminish the audience and result in the loss of 
some precision or force in the expression. For example, if. flag 
burning is prohibited, the individual can still say why the flag 
should be burned and can even conjure up the image of the flag, 
burning. Regulation of religious conduct, on the other hand, 
may result in totally banning a religious exercise. For example, 
prohibiting alcohol consumption makes it illegal for a worship-
per to partake of the blood of Christ. The substitution of grape 
juice is likely to destroy the significance of the rite for believers 
in transubstantiation. Thus, since religious exercise actually 
needs more protection from generally applicable laws regulating 
conduct than does free speech, it is wrongheaded to give it less 
protection. 
Ultimately, the Court will realize that free exercise is enti-
tled to the same protections as free expression. The issue is 
whether parity requires that the protection for the exercise of 
religion be raised to the level afforded expression, or whether 
the level of protection afforded expression should be reduced to 
the level given the exercise of religion. 
The pressure to equalize standards for free speech and free 
exercise may direct the Court to a position that inquires only as 
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to the law's neutrality and general applicability.U7 The proposi-
tion that the incidental effect of a generally applicable law on 
religion is constitutionally insignificant depends on a view of the 
First Amendment centered on the purpose of the law rather than 
the effect on the speaker. That view may have force with respect 
to the Free Speech Clause as well. 
III. THE PROBLEMS OF PURPOSE 
The First Amendment is more than a drafting exercise. No 
Justice believes that the state constitutionally can use generally 
applicable regulations of conduct for the purpose of suppressing 
religion. That is why the Court has insisted that laws must be 
COIJtent-neutral as well as generally applicable to avoid height-
ened scrutinyY8 The same reasoning should also be true with 
respect to regulations of expression. But the nature of the in-
q~iry, according to Justice Scalia, is "whether the purpose of the 
law is to suppress communication."119 
Any attempt to base a constitutional test on a determination 
of the purpose of a legislative act will fail to sufficiently protect 
117. In this scenario, the five votes in support of Smith- Justices Kennedy, Rehn-
quist, Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas - would be crucial. Justice Scalia is committed to 
abandoning O'Brien. Justice Thomas generally has indicated a judicial philosophy in 
line with Justice Scalia although he has not passed on this specific question in a free 
speech case. Justice Kennedy joined the majority in Cowles and is the author of the 
suggestion in Turner that indicates the potential change in First Amendment doctrine. 
See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens joined in 
the Cowles opinion. Although Justice Stevens dissented in Barnes, applying the 
O'Brien test, the dissent in which he joined focused on the lack of generality of the law 
and its purpose to suppress expression - in other words, it was not in his view a con-
tent-neutral law. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 587. The ambiguity ("may or may not be subject to 
heightened scrutiny") in Justice Kennedy's comment on neutral generally applicable 
laws in Turner may have reflected his need to keep Justices Blackmun and Souter with 
him in that case. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458. That he left the sentence in the opinion 
suggests controversy within the Court. 
118. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79. 
119. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 578 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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the interests of the First Amendment. Justice Scalia's insistence 
on an objective test that ignores subjective legislative motivation 
is inadequate to determine whether the legislation has a forbid-
den objective. Even the more expansive equal protection in-
quiry proposed by Justice Kennedy in Lukumi ultimately will 
allow speech suppression that should be barred. The Court 
should continue to use prophylactic tests that invalidate some 
laws with a proper objective in order to reduce the possibility 
that laws with an improper purpose will survive. 
A. Legislative Purpose v. Legislative Motivation 
Justice Scalia has criticized the Court's use of a standard 
that requires a determination of legislative purpose, at least 
when "legislative purpose" means the "actual motives of those 
responsible for the challenged action" as in the context of the 
"secular purpose" portion of the Lemon test for establishment bf· 
religion. 
For while it is possible to discern the objective "purpose" of a 
statute (i.e. the public good at which its provisions appear to be 
directed), or even the formal motivation for a statute where that 
is explicitly set forth ... , discerning the subjective motivation of 
those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an im-
possible task.120 
On this basis, Justice Scalia argued that the subjective intent of 
government decisionmakers should be sought only if the Consti-
tutional provision commands the Court to do so.121 Thus, in 
Barnes when he called for an investigation into purpose, "the 
threshold inquiry of whether the purpose of the law is to sup-
press communication,"122 he was referring to the "objective pur-
pose," "the public good at which its provisions appear to be 
120. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
121. /d. at 639. 
122. 501 U.S. 560, 578 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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directed. "123 This concept was based on the provisions of the 
statute and some common sense about the world in which the 
statute operates, not an inquiry into the "subjective motivation 
of those enacting the statute."124 
Justice Scalia uses different methods of interpretation for 
statute and Constitution - eschewing legislative history in statu-
tory interpretation and seeking it out for the interpretation of 
clauses of the Constitution.l25 His criticism of the use of legisla-
tive history in statutory interpretation has been widely noted.126 
However, here the aim of the inquiry into purpose is not to in-
terpret the language to determine its applicatipn but to deter-
mine whether a facially neutral statute has an unneutral end. 
That is a very different issue. 
Any discussion of the purpose of a law runs into the quan-
dary that statutes are the products of multimember bodies whose 
members may have both different motives (why they want the 
statute enacted) and different goals (how they want the statute 
to apply) for the same vote. Justice Scalia escapes the quagmire 
by refusing to look at the legislators and focusing on the legisla-
tion. As an interpretive methodology, the "objective" approach 
has several virtues: It avoids the difficulties of determining moti-
vation, it sets forth an intelligible standard for Congress to fol-
low in accomplishing its purposes, and it pressures Congress to 
accomplish its aims through the statutory language rather than 
by means of insertions of speeches into the record. The cost of 
errors in statutory interpretation is checked because Congress 
can revise the law if it dislikes the decision. 
123. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636. 
124. /d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
125. See generally Arthur Stock, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Con-
stitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DuKE L. J. 160. 
126. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 
(1990). 
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When the Court upholds a law that restrains a person from 
expression, especially the expression of unpopular views, the leg-
islature is under no pressure to revise it. The essential question 
is whether facially neutral criteria are being used as a proxy for 
the suspect criteria of speech or religious exercise. Ignoring evi-
dence of illicit motivation simplifies the case, but it increases the 
possibility of upholding speech suppression that was not inciden-
tal at all. 
Justice Scalia purported to admire O'Brien for eschewing an 
inquiry into illicit motivation, but that decision avoided the in-
quiry by substituting a balancing test that evaluated the impor-
tance of the government interest and available alternatives to 
accomplish it. In Barnes, Justice Scalia specifically repudiated 
the O'Brien test: "I think we should avoid wherever possible, 
moreover, a method of analysis that requires judicial assessment 
of the 'importance' of government interests.m27 
Finding the "object" of legislation through careful analysis 
of the text and context of the law may yield clear and determi-
nate results as it did in Lukumi. However, the resulting unanim-
ity in that case should not obscure the difficulty of the task. If a 
statute restricts religion or expression, the effect is plain. If it 
does so while purporting to be neutral, it is possible to examine 
whether any other conduct is in fact affected. If the statute af-
fects additional unprotected conduct, the additional scope of the 
statute raises questions regarding its "object." The weakness of 
the state's interest in regulating the additional conduct may sug-
gest that it is no more than protective coloration for a statute, 
the object of which is to suppress expression or religious exer-
cise. Unless those interests are in some way weighed, the judge 
may validate a law that was enacted solely to suppress expres-
sion. Furthermore, the judgment on the "object" of the law may 
127. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 580 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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be a close one where a weak but legitimate basis for the law can 
be identified. In those instances, it should be relevant that a sub-
stantial body of legislators avowedly acted to harm religion or 
expression. 
Justice Scalia's objective test would ignore statements made 
during the course of legislative debate that a statute is aimed at 
destroying a religion and the impact on others is simply an un-
fortunate cost of making the law generally applicable. Where 
such statements are not in the text of the statute and no over-
breadth or underinclusiveness can be shown, Justice Scalia's doc-
trine would lead him to uphold the statute despite the 
insignificance of the governmental interest it purports to 
vindicate. 
If Justice Scalia refuses to assess the importance of the gov-
ernment interest in legislation and ignores legislative motives, he 
is likely to uphold some generally applicable laws that exist 
solely because they harm some disfavored speech or religion. 
This methodology is an open invitation to the intolerant to use 
generally applicable laws as a tool to suppress ideas. Such laws 
are not the most convenient tools - rather like using a two-by-
four instead of a hammer to pound nails - but they may do the 
job. 
B. Equal Protection Analysis of the Neutrality of Generally 
Applicable Laws 
An inquiry into legislative intent has been the hallmark, not 
of First Amendment jurisprudence, but of equal protection doc-
trine. A race-neutral law challenged under the Equal Protection 
Clause on the grounds that it has the effect of disproportionately 
disadvantaging a particular racial group will be struck down only 
if the person attacking its validity can show that the law was ra-
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cially motivated.128 Thus, Justice Kennedy wrote in Lukumi: 
"[i]n determining whether the object of a law is a neutral one 
under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance in our 
equal protection cases. "129 Justice Kennedy then examined the 
transcripts of the city council meeting where the ordinance in 
question was adopted as evidence that the object of the ordi-
nance was to discriminate against the Santeria religion.130 This 
acceptance of evidence of subjective motivation in assessing the 
neutrality of a statute is an advance over Justice Scalia's position. 
It remains, however, a step short of the protection needed for 
expression. The Court's decision to require a racial "intent" in 
equal protection jurisprudence was the product of a variety of 
considerations that do not apply to free speech. Furthermore, 
the Court has departed from a rigid intent requirement within its 
equal protection analysis. 
The words "equal protection of the laws" invoke issues of 
classification or comparison. They do not on their face indicate 
which classifications are forbidden.131 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment was designed to pr9hibit racial discrimination.132 Govern-
mental entities that wished to engage in racial discrimination 
learned to disguise their behavior by using non-racial language. 
From the use of the grandfather clause in voting rights133 to the 
gerrymandered boundaries of Thskegee, 134 the Court recognized 
and struck down the use of facially neutral classifications as 
128. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
129. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540. 
130. /d. at 540-41. 
131. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982). 
132. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); See generally H. Hv. 
MAN AND W. WIECEK, EouAL JuSTICE UNDER LAw: CoNSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
1835-1875 (1982). 
133. See, e.g., Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); Guinn v. United States, 238 
u.s. 347 (1915). 
134. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
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proxies for race. The early statutes were crude. The intentional 
discrimination was identified easily, and the laws were struck 
down. However, experience gave governmental actors greater 
sophistication, and they have adopted more subtle measures. 
Today it is infinitely more difficult to ferret out illegitimate moti-
vation in statutes that use non-racial criteria that result in a dis-
proportionate racial effect. When persons challenging a facially 
neutral statute have the burden of proving it was racially moti-
vated, they often will fail. The more difficult the requirements of 
proof, the more likely that illegitimate motivation will escape ju-
dicial sanction. 
The Court might have adopted a balancing test - weighing 
the importance of the non-racial interest the criteria arguably 
serves against the harm of the racially disproportionate impact 
- to assure that race was not a factor in the classification.135 
The Court offered two reasons in Washington v. Davis136 for its 
rejection of such an approach- precedent and the institutional 
role of the court.137 The Court also might have noted that a bal-
ancing test could injure some members of the group allegedly 
discriminated against. These reasons, however, do not apply to 
the use of balancing tests under the First Amendment for facially 
content-neutral laws that have an impact on speech or religious 
exercise. 
1. Reasons for the Purpose Test in Equal Protection 
The Davis Court had little trouble identifying a series of 
cases in jury selection, voting, and education that contained 
statements that the racial impact of laws did not constitute a con-
135. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory 
of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297 (1987). 
136. 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
137. /d. at 239-41. 
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stitutional violation without a showing of a purpose to 
discriminate.138 
One reason for the precedents is the fear that a balancing 
test triggered by racial disproportionality would lead to judicial 
intervention on the wisdom of most existing laws.139 All laws 
classify. In view of the racial differences in our society, most 
classifications in laws have differential racial impacts. Residen-
tial segregation, however caused, means that geographical classi-
fications have a racial impact. Because African-Americans are 
represented disproportionately in the lower economic class, vir-
tually all statutes with a financial aspect will have a dispropor-
tionate impact leaving every law open to challenge. 
If an equal protection effects test applied only where a his-
torically disadvantaged group was burdened, the doctrine would 
pressure all laws to favor that group. Even if the result were 
just, it would be politically impossible to maintain a democratic 
society with such a bias against the majority. If the effects test 
applied regardless of which racial group was adversely affected, 
then all laws would require judicial approval. 
In short, an effects test strains the judicial capacity of the 
Court because it would render almost every law prima facie in-
valid. If such a test required a justification above the present 
rational basis standard, it would immerse the judiciary in second 
guessing the legislature on the wisdom of virtually all of its meas-
ures. It is not surprising that the Court avoided such a result. 
138. /d. at 239-40 (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973); 
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945)). 
139. "A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, 
absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than 
another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps 
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing stat-
utes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the 
more affluent white." Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. 
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Another reason the Court has resisted the use of a balanc-
ing test for equal protection is its effect on members of the class 
intended to be protected. Where race is not the classifying de-
vice, some members of the disfavored race are likely to receive 
the law's benefits. For example, a capital gains tax reduction dis-
proportionately favors whites, but wealthy blacks also would 
have their taxes reduced. Thus, a doctrine requiring more than a 
rational basis to sustain laws with disproportionate racial effects 
would harm some members of the very class the Court sought to 
protect. An equal protection balancing test is all or nothing -
the law will either be valid or invalid. The laws cannot be re-
drafted to focus on disfavored groups and then allow them to opt 
out. The Court cannot eliminate the law's racial impact without 
preventing the legislature from pursuing the interest that led it to 
enact the law - e.g. it cannot invalidate the capital gains tax 
deduction for whites because of its racially disproportionate ef-
fect but allow blacks to take it. 
Thus, a combination of factors prevents the Court from 
adopting an effects test for equal protection violations and leads 
it to retain the "invidious purpose" inquiry. Balancing in equal 
protection makes every law a federal case and the sole remedy 
the drastic one of total invalidation. If racial effect is the only 
interest that explains a classification, the law will be struck down 
for its invidious purpose. However, if the law serves or might 
serve a legitimate interest the balancing test threatens to prevent 
the government from pursuing that interest even though it bene-
fits some members of the group on whose behalf the Court 
would act. 
2. Sub Rosa Balancing in Equal Protection 
Although the balancing test for the First Amendment has 
been contrasted with the search for invidious purpose in equal 
protection cases, Justice O'Connor claimed in Smith that "appli-
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cation of our established free exercise doctrine to this case" 
would not "necessarily be incompatible with our equal protec-
tion cases. "140 
Daniel R. Ortiz has noted that the Court announces in 
equal protection cases that its inquiry is into the intent of the 
government body, but that its practice uses more objective fac-
tors.141 In particular, the Court requires less evidence to prove 
intent in voting and jury selection cases than in housing and em-
ployment cases.142 
Some problems of balancing in equal protection cases are 
reduced by limitations on that doctrine's scope. The greater the 
injury to the structure of government from racial disparities, the 
greater the incentive to lower the standard of proof necessary to 
show that the disparity is the object of the classification. Accept-
able proof determines the degree to which discriminating parties 
escape detection and also the number of innocent parties disad-
vantaged. However, under any standard of proof for discrimina-
tory purpose, some discriminating parties escape detection. 
3. The Inappropriateness of Equal Protection Standards 
in First Amendment Cases 
The language of the Equal Protection Clause is language of 
classification. Thus, the search for purpose as a mechanism to 
determine the true basis for classification is tied to the language 
of the Constitutional provision, and supported by numerous 
precedents. Freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion 
do not on their face appear limited to laws classifying on speech 
or religious grounds. Lower scrutiny has few free speech prece-
140. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 
U.S. 613, 618 (1982); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-95 (1977)). 
141. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105 
(1989). 
142. Id. at 1107. 
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dents to support its methodology, and the free exercise prece-
dents for low scrutiny of generally applicable rules of conduct 
had been ignored for three decades. 
In Smith, Justice Scalia put forth a parade of horribles that 
would result from a balancing test under the First Amendment, 
arguing that almost every activity could be engaged in for ex-
pressive purposes and thus every law could become an object of 
scrutiny.143 However, the issue would not be the classifications 
made by the law (and thus whether the law can be applied at all) 
but the law's validity as applied to the activity when it is engaged 
in for expressive purposes. In fact, few laws would be subject to 
challenge as applied. Although a limitless number of actions 
"could" be expressive, they rarely are. Furthermore, requiring 
the state to show a compelling reason for the application of a 
general law to expressive conduct or speech would not favor any 
particular group or speech. Thus, applying a higher level of scru-
tiny to the incidental impairment of expression or religious exer-
cise would not pose extraordinary difficulties for the Court. 
Scrutinizing the application of the law in a specific instance 
with a balancing test does not threaten the law's general validity. 
The group benefited by the invalidation consists of those persons 
who engage in expression, and that group is coextensive with the 
reach of the decision that strikes down the law as applied. The 
benefits of the law still are obtained with respect to all of its 
other applications. 
Since the main reasons for rejecting balancing under the 
Equal Protection Clause for facially neutral laws do not apply to 
balancing under the First Amendment, and the potential danger 
of pretextual classifications is just as great, a balancing test 
would be preferable to the direct inquiry into purpose as a 
143. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89. 
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means of assuring that neutral laws of general application do not 
have the improper purpose of impairing free expression. 
C. Prophylactic Precedent 
Although the suggestion that neutral, generally applicable 
laws impairing speech should receive no heightened scrutiny ap-
pears to assume that the purpose of the law is crucial to its valid-
ity, the Court has never openly adopted a purpose-centered 
vision of the First Amendment. Indeed, the Court has invali-
dated laws restricting speech or press while indicating that the 
law's purpose was legitimate.144 The nearest approach to a pur-
pose-centered inquiry is Justice Scalia's argument that such an 
inquiry is supported by the Court's holdings with respect to laws 
that do not directly or indirectly impede speech.145 But Justice 
Scalia also has said that a law restricting speech must meet a high 
standard of justification even if the purpose of the restriction has 
nothing to do with the suppression of communication.146 Thus, 
precedent seems to discourage any attempt to assert a purpose-
centered standard for determining abridgments of freedom of 
speech or of the press. 
On the other hand, the free speech decisions of the 
Supreme Court are consistent with a purpose-centered view of 
the First Amen,dment.147 The "high standard" often simply 
guards against use of the law to suppress communication. For 
example, in Saia v. New York, 148 the Court said that the lack of 
standards for a loudspeaker permit posed too great a danger that 
144. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down ban on leaflet-
ting despite anti-littering justification). 
145. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 578 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
146. !d. at 576. 
147. See generally DAVID S. BoGEN, BuLWARK OF LIBERTY (1984); Elena Kagan, 
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996). 
148. 334 u.s. 558 (1948). 
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the authorities would base their discretion on the content of the 
speech.149 A law prohibiting leafletting on public streets might 
be enacted because leafletting in public places is a major vehicle 
of communication for government critics outside the main-
stream. Most, if not all, of the Court's precedents can be charac-
terized as standards to insure the forbidden purpose is not 
involved in laws impairing speech. But .such a prophylactic ap-
proach to purpose is more speech protective than the limited in-
quiry into the object of the law . .that Justice Scalia urges for free 
exercise and expressive conduct cases. 
In free speech cases, the Court uses objective tests that put 
the burden on the government to demonstrate that its actions 
had a legitimate basis and that it could not satisfy those legiti-
mate interests as well by other means that impose a lesser bur-
den on speech. If the law affects speech and the state justifies 
the law with an unimportant or insubstantial interest, then there 
is a strong possibility that the speech-impairing effect is the real 
reason for the law. If the interest is significant, but it could be 
satisfied as well by other means that have less impact on expres-
sion, then the choice of the means or the scope of the statute 
may have been influenced by illegitimate concerns. Thus, the 
various tests used by the -Court in free speech cases involving 
"content-neutral" laws can be derived from the principle that 
suppression of free expression is not a legitimate purpose of 
government. 
The religion cases also may be reconciled with a purpose-
centered inquiry.150 Indeed, Justice Scalia attempted to do so. 
149. /d. at 562. 
150. The history of the Free Exercise Clause may be read in a narrow framework. 
The framers were concerned that individuals be free to reject the majority religion. 
They understood that religious belief and prevailing religious worship caused no harm 
except to the sensibility of those who had different views, and that the accident of dif-
ferent views should not result in punishment. However, there is little evidence that the 
authors of the Constitution considered behavior protected when it affected others. See 
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His distinction ·Of Sherbert and Yoder, however, as outside this 
standard made his enterprise questionable. Both the Sherbert 
and Yoder lines may be reconciled with the basic notion of for-
bidden purpose by using the analysis just applied to the free 
speech cases. In unemployment compensation cases, the statute 
withholds benefits if the claimant refuses available work, but ex-
cuses the claimant when there. are compelling personal reasons, 
such as dangers to health, for refusing the job. A determination 
that refusal to work for religious reasons is not an acceptable 
reason for unemployment could be a product of hostility to such 
religious beliefs. Given the trivial impact on the fund from all 
such claims, the state's interest in protecting the fund from such 
claims seems insignificant, and the possibility that an illegitimate 
concern influenced the denial of benefits is too great. The Yoder 
balancing may also be explained as an attempt to be sure that 
the scope of the mandatory school law did not include overriding 
religious beliefs because of antipathy to those beliefs. 
William Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Ex-
emption, 40 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 357, 376-79 (1989-90). There is instead substantial 
support for the proposition that the framers understood that religious belief was not 
grounds to exempt an individual from a generally applicable statute. Ellis West, The 
Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
Pus. PoL'Y 591, 623-33 (1990). 
In the end, however, history can be pressed into service for other positions. If the 
framers did not anticipate exempting religious worship from generally applicable laws, 
they may have focused only on laws serving important or substantial government inter-
ests. They were concerned with protecting religious worship, and Madison, for exam-
ple, supported exemptions for conscientious objection to military service. 1 ANNALS oF 
CoNG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). By stressing their concern for both speech and 
religion and noting the changes within our society that have resulted in pervasive gov-
ernment regulation, a plausible argument may be made that the purposes the First 
Amendment was designed to serve require protection even from generally applicable 
regulations of conduct. 
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IV. THE LIMITS OF THE CoMPELLING INTEREST STANDARD 
Thus far, this article has argued that the Court should have 
a similar standard for generally applicable laws under both the 
Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment, 
and that an exemption from heightened scrutiny for those laws 
that are "neutral" will under-protect both religion and speech 
even if the constitutional guarantees are understood to be di-
rected to the purpose of the law. Prophylactic standat:ds are 
more appropriate to preclude the possibility of illegitimate pur-
pose. On the other hand, it is unrealistic and unwise for the 
Court to use its most stringent test to review the incidental re-
strictions on speech and religion imposed by neutral, generally 
applicable laws. 
A "compelling interest" standard would. afford the greatest 
protection to speech and religion, but the standard is not worka-
ble. It cannot apply to all neutral, generally applicable laws, it is 
difficult to distinguish any subset of such laws to which it might 
be applied, and its application there would dilute its effective-
ness where it currently applies. 
The Court cannot practically require the highest standard to 
justify minimal impacts on speech or religion. Because govern-
ment's interest in particular laws can rarely be characterized as 
anything more than substantial, a compelling interest test would 
exempt individuals from most laws which negatively affect their 
speech or religion. Privileging religion or speech from the most 
trivial impairment would be intolerable. Even the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act requires a substantial impairment to 
trigger the compelling interest test.151 Thus, the compelling in-
terest standard is unsuitable for evaluating all incidental restric-
tions on speech. 
151. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb-1 (1994). 
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The Court will have difficulty identifying an appropriate 
subset of neutral, generally applicable laws for heightened scru-
tiny. The Court has not yet adequately defined such a class de-
spite the suggestions of scholars.152 Professor Michael C. Dorf 
has argued that heightened scrutiny for generally applicable laws 
should depend on the substantiality of the impairment of 
rights.153 Substantiality, however, is a matter of degree. As an 
on-off switch for heightened scrutiny, it is arbitrary. It is both 
underprotective and overprotective unless the "substantiality" of 
the impairment is contextual - i.e. varies with the strength of 
the state's interest and the availability of non-restrictive alterna-
tives that would satisfy that interest. If those factors are consid-
ered, the scrutiny takes place before the "determination" of the 
level of scrutiny. The real test would be balancing, and it would 
apply to all laws impacting speech or religion. 
Further, even if the Court could distinguish among neutral, 
generally applicable laws, a compelling interest is not the appro-
priate heightened scrutiny. The Court can manipulate almost 
any test in application. As a result, the use of a compelling inter-
est test with respect to laws incidentally impacting speech or reli-
gion would undermine its strength in evaluating racially 
discriminatory laws and those that directly impair speech or 
religion.· 
The stringency of a compelling interest test depends on the 
values of the judges who implement it. The Court is unlikely to 
preclude government from vindicating legitimate interests by 
laws with only an incidental impact on religion, regardless of the 
152. Srinivasan suggested a test based on the likelihood of speech-suppressive ad-
ministrative motivation. However, rather than urging a compelling interest test, he dis-
tinguished cases subject to O'Brien and those receiving no review. Srinivasan, supra 
note 107. 
153. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1175, 1210 (1996). 
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test articulated. The Court may find that the government's inter-
est in avoiding administrative problems or difficulties in distin-
guishing among groups that might seek exemptions is 
compelling. Thus, the Court upheld the application to the 
Amish of the social security laws in United States v. Lee,154 and 
Justice O'Connor found the compelling interest test satisfied in 
Smith. 155 Nevertheless, the articulated standard constrains the 
Court to some degree. 
The standard for evaluating neutral, generally applicable 
laws under the First Amendment should not be as high as the 
standard for justification of racially discriminatory laws. First, 
the neutrality and general applicability of a law provide substan-
tial warrant that any impact on speech is incidental.156 A neu-
154. 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982). Few laws, looked at individually, can show a compel-
ling interest for their application to expression or religious exercise. On the other hand, 
the total impact on society from a religious and expressive exemption for most laws 
could be quite significant. For example, one cost of exemption is the necessity to make 
a determination whether the particular individual is acting with a religious or expressive 
purpose. The social cost of time and energy to make this determination under one law 
may not be significant, but if cumulated for all laws, it could have a large impact. The 
"compelling interest" in the specific case, then, may be the absence of sufficient 
grounds to distinguish this requested exemption from exemptions to other laws that 
cumulatively would have a substantial impact on the operations of government. 
155. 494 U.S. 872, 904-05 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
156. There is a good argument for the compelling interest test if there is evidence 
that a law of general application was targeted at speech or religion. That would be 
analogous to mixed motive cases like Mount Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), 
where the Court requires the government to prove that it would have acted the same 
way in the absence of the impermissible motive. /d. at 287. But Mount Healthy's stan-
dard applies to administrative decisions against individuals, where invalidating the dis-
charge has a limited impact on the general power of government to address public 
needs. 
A compelling interest standard for mixed motive statutes could disable govern-
ment from advancing important or substantial legitimate interests. The problems of 
motive attribution differ from those in administrative decisions. If one legislator's state-
ment of improper reasons triggers a compelling interest requirement, the entire body 
politic is punished for the sins of one member. If the law is struck down for an illegiti-
mate purpose, legislators might voice only good motives for its reenactment. Unless the 
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tral, generally applicable law may affect an individual's speech, 
expression or religious exercise, but it is unlikely to have a signif-
icant effect on speech or religion in general. As long as the 
Court prevents laws from being targeted at speech or religion, 
people who wish to express particular religious convictions or 
ideas need not curb their activities for fear that the government 
will persecute them. 
Second, the conduct regulated by most generally applicable 
laws poses the same probl~m for society, whether or not it is 
engaged in for religious or expressive reasons. Thus, the justifi-
cation for applying the law to the protected activity is the same 
as the justification for the statute itself. Assuming that the law 
would be valid with respect to these other applications, a reli-
gious or expression exemption would disable government from 
acting to protect its legitimate interests. A "compelling interest" 
standard could expand significantly the scope of situations where 
government is powerless to vindicate the legitimate concerns of 
its constituents. 
In theory, a compelling interest requirement could adjust 
the interest to the constitutional guarantee. If a "compelling in-
terest" means an interest sufficient to compel a rational judge to 
believe that a legislator acted appropriately in making a classifi-
cation, it would have a very different bite for equal protection 
and the First Amendment. Given the harm done historically by 
state's interest is compelling, however, the Court will suspect the impermissible purpose 
continues to affect the law. But refusal to uphold the reenactment deprives the legisla-
ture of the power to enact an appropriate law. 
O'Brien may still be an appropriate standard because. it strikes a balance between 
the ability of government to act for legitimate purposes and the protection of speech. 
Where the balance is struck depends on the Court's view of the requirement that the 
state's interest be "important or substantial" and that the impact on speech be no 
greater than essential to further that interest. Evidence that the law was targeted at 
speech or religion goes to the significance of the burden and should reduce the defer-
ence paid to legislative judgments of importance and necessity. 
HeinOnline -- 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 252 1996-1997
252 SOUTHWESTERN UNWERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
racial discrimination, a legislator cannot appropriately create a 
racial classification that discriminates against a historically disfa-
vored minority unless there is no rational choice but to do so. 
That is a very tough standard to meet, but a lesser one would 
raise the specter of segregation's return. 
On the other hand, a non-trivial government interest may 
be sufficient to compel a judge to believe that a legislator acted 
appropriately in enacting a law that vindicated that interest 
1 against constitutionally protected as well as unprotected activity. 
Previous uses of "compelling interest" have reflected the differ-
ential impact of the test in different settings. In both Smith and 
Barnes, Justice Scalia's analysis of the caselaw found that the 
Court always upheld neutral, generally applicable laws under a 
First Amendment test that purported to afford them higher scru-
tiny.157 If in Smith or Cowles or any of the cases analyzed by 
Justice Scalia, the state were required to show an interest as 
compelling as that required to justify a racially discriminatory 
law, few of those laws would have survived the challenge. 
The problem with using this compelling interest test for all 
constitutional guarantees is its instability. Perhaps it is possible 
to live with a "compelling interest" standard in which an interest 
is compelling for purposes of one constitutional guarantee and 
not another, but it would be extremely difficult to do so. 
Although the Court's past practice demonstrated contextual va-
riation, it never admitted that it was using "compelling" in this 
way. There were several reasons for its failure to say who was 
157. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 576-77 (Scalia, J., concurring). "We have never invalidated 
the application of a general law simply because the conduct that it reached was being 
engaged in for expressive purposes and the government could not demonstrate a suffi-
ciently important state interest." ld. at 577. See also Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-85. "We 
have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except 
the denial of unemployment compensation. Although we have sometimes purported to 
apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the test satis-
fied." ld. at 883. 
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"compelled" to do what. First, an express articulation that the 
standard measures whether the Court is compelled to believe 
that the enactment was for a legitimate purpose could easily col-
lapse into a direct purpose inquiry, which would prove to be an 
unsatisfactory protection for speech and would substantially un-
dermine protections against racial discrimination as well. Sec-
ond, different outcomes suggest one right is more protected than 
another - i.e. equality is more important than freedom of 
speech - although there is no underlying theoretical basis for 
the preference. Finally, this would likely lead to pressure to 
eliminate the differential impact, which would either diminish 
the strength of the guarantee for Fourteenth Amendment pur-
poses or raise the standard for the First Amendment. 
If the compelling interest test will not necessarily be speech 
protective, and its use for generally applicable laws carries a sub-
stantial risk of devaluing the test for use in situations that 
threaten core constitutional concerns, it would be better to look 
· to an alternative standard for dealing with the issues posed by 
generally applicable laws. 
V. A BALANCED TEsT FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PuRPOSES 
The obvious candidate for a test to evaluate neutral, gener-
ally applicable laws is O'Brien. The O'Brien test sustains a con-
tent-neutral regulation if "it furthers an important or substantial 
government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest. "158 Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion in Turner referred to O'Brien's test as the "inter-
mediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral 
158. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
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restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech. "159 
O'Brien provides the appropriate standard to review generally 
applicable laws, since they are characterized by the likelihood 
that any burden they impose on speech is incidental. The stan-
dard applies equally well to protect the free exercise of 
religion.160 
The O'Brien test is designed to permit government to enact 
laws for legitimate purposes while guarding against restrictions 
directed at speech. "Intermediate" tests, like O'Brien, are open 
to attack from both sides - for being either too strict or too 
weak. Its operation depends on the values of the judges, which 
makes it vulnerable to attack as unprincipled ad hoc decision-
making. But moderation may be a virtue when core values are 
protected and principle~ clash. Balancing reflects the values at 
stake and is appropriate where confined in scope and done with 
an understanding of its use. The O'Brien formulation allows bal-
ancing, but the Court should consider the factors to be balanced 
more openly, recognizing the function of the test as a prophylac-
tic means to assure that there is no impermissible purpose. 
Although the O'Brien standard is an imperfect mechanism 
to detect an impermissible purpose, it is the best alternative. 
Both the "important or substantial interest" and the "no greater 
than is essential" portions of the test may invalidate laws that did 
not have suppression of speech as a purpose. The imperfect fit 
of O'Brien could tempt the Court to examine the purpose of the 
statute more directly. However, that would be a mistake. It 
159. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469. 
160. See Robert D. Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 
CoNsT. CoMMENTARY 147, 152 (1987) (arguing that the Court should adopt O'Brien's 
methodology for free exercise claims). See also Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent Meth-
odology for First Amendment Speech and Religion Clause Cases, 48 V AND. L. REv. 
1335, 1343 n.31 (1995) (arguing that the "free speech methodology typified by O'Brien 
and Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), should be 
incorporated into the Court's free exercise of religion jurisprudence."). 
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would fail to eliminate the possibility that antipathy for that ex-
pression or religion produced the lack of an exemption to the 
generally applicable law. The difficulty of proving a covert pur-
pose enables too many laws to pass a test based on the statute's 
objective. O'Brien permits the government to accomplish any 
significant legitimate objective by redrafting the law, but the 
O'Brien test decreases the likelihood that a law with an imper-
missible purpose will survive constitutional scrutiny. 
A number of critics argue that the O'Brien standard is ex-
cessively deferential to the government.161 It does not require 
that the regulation be the least restrictive means of achieving the 
state interest, only that no less restrictive alternative is capable 
of serving the state's interest as efficiently.162 Commentators 
complain that O'Brien does not balance the marginal benefits of 
the challenged restriction relative to alternative means.163 That 
critique is not necessarily true. Like the "compelling interest" 
test, the substance of the O'Brien test depends heavily on how 
judges apply it. 
By remanding or reversing decisions that upheld challenged 
laws, the Court recently invigorated the requirement that the in-
cidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms be "no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance" of an important or 
substantial government interest.164 The laws in question were 
161. Dorf, supra note 153, at 1208; Keith Werhan, The O'Briening of Free Speech 
Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 641-44 (1987); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A 
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 
88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1483-86 (1975). 
162. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,797-99 (1989); Ely, supra note 161, 
at 1484-85. 
163. Dorf, supra note 153, at 1208. 
164. See 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) (reversing ban on 
liquor price advertising because more extensive than necessary to serve the state's inter-
est); See also Turner, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (remanding under O'Brien, the FCC "must 
carry" rules that required cable operators to carry broadcast stations on cable 
channels). 
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not generally applicable, but regulations of commercial speech 
and cable television. These laws presented a higher risk for sup-
pression of speech than most neutral, generally applicable laws, 
and the Court appropriately raised the barriers. 
Rhode Island's ban on advertising liquor prices was struck 
down last term in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island. 165 The 
Court's First Amendment test for commercial speech required in 
part that any impact on free speech be '.'not more extensive than 
is necessary to serve" a substantial state interest.166 In Board of 
Trustees v. Fox,167 the Court stated that this prong of its commer-
cial speech test was no more rigid than that of O'Brien.168 In 44 
Liquormart, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion for four Jus-
tices cited Fox for the standard that the law must be narrowly 
tailored and held that Rhode Island's statute was unconstitu-
tional in view of available altematives.169 Although some of the 
alternatives may have served the state's interest in moderation 
as efficiently as the price advertising ban, they each had draw-
backs.170 Thus, the Court applied scrutiny with some bite. 
In Turner, cable operators appealed a summary judgment 
which upheld a federal law that required them to carry broadcast 
stations on cable channels. The Supreme Court agreed with the 
court below that the requirement was content-neutral, and that 
O'Brien was the proper level of scrutiny for content-neutral inci-
165. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). 
166. /d. at 1506 n.9 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
167. 492 u.s. 469 (1989). 
168. /d. at 478. 
169. 116 S. Ct. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter 
and Breyer, JJ.) (quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). 
170. Setting minimum prices for alcohol or raising taxes on it would shift purchases 
to stores in neighboring states. A per capita limit on alcohol purchases would have a 
similar effect and could be difficult to administer effectively. The effectiveness of an 
educational campaign on the dangers of alcohol consumption may be questioned and it 
costs money in a period when state budgets are tight. 
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dental restrictions on speech.171 Nevertheless, the Court re-
versed the summary jtidgment.172 It remanded the case for more 
evidence on all aspects of the factors relevant under O'Brien-
the need for the legislation, the extent of the impairment on 
speech interests, and the available altematives.173 
The remand in Turner and the concurring opinion in 44 Li-
quormart demonstrate that the Court can examine laws closely 
under O'Brien. The closeness of that examination should tum 
on the law's potential as a vehicle for the suppression of ideas. 
A Court applying O'Brien's tests may consider the impact of the 
law. The more substantial the burden on speech or religion, the 
lower the deference to legislative judgments of importance or 
necessity. This enables the doctrine to serve as a prophylactic 
test that protects against impermissible purpose while enabling 
the government to satisfy the legitimate interests of its citizens. 
Abstract analysis of the importance of the governmental in-
terest is insufficient, regardless of whether the court applies a 
standard of "compelling interest" or simply "substantial or im-
portant" interest. It is always possible to inflate by abstraction 
the interest on either side of a statute - the burning of a draft 
card becomes the interest in the national defense or the societal 
interest in freedom of speech. The Court should engage in the 
more particularized inquiry of whether the application of the 
rule to this religious or expressive activity is necessary to further 
the social interest. The importance of the government interest 
can best be evaluated in that incremental inquiry. In the "as ap-
plied" challenge, the question is not "why did you pass the law?" 
but "why is it being applied to this expression or religious exer-
cise?" Since the government may have the power to exempt 
171. Turner, 114 S. Ct. 2445 at 2469 (1994). 
172. /d. at 2472. 
173. /d. at 2469, 2471-72. 
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"constitutionally protected" activities from the scope of the law, 
it should justify its failure to do so. 
In sum, the O'Brien inquiry directs the attention of the 
Court to more appropriate measures of the validity of the law 
under the First Amendment. It protects against improper pur-
pose by demanding a government interest unrelated to suppres-
sion of free expression, and gives the Court a tool to make it 
effective by demanding the interest be important or substantial 
and that the impact on speech (or religion) be no greater than is 
essential to further that interest. If we are to have the same stan-
dards for generally applicable laws in both free exercise and free 
speech cases, those standards should have some First Amend-
ment bite. 
